The question of the relation of embodiment and subjectivity in Husserl might be posed, for example, by asking what role and in what form and to what extent is embodiment basic for the subjective character of experience in the narrower, most elementary sense of the term “inner consciousness” or inwardness, which Husserl initially analyses independently of embodiment, in the framework of inner temporal consciousness. It would seem that in the later genetico phenomenological reflections which treat temporal con¬sciousness in the context of affectivity in the broad sense of the word and ki¬naesthetic experiencing (at least according to the interpretation of L. Land grebe, which is the basis of the presentation of this topic) bodily inward nessand “mineful” inward experiencing are two closely connected, yet different, fundamental characteristics of the life of consciousness, and that the ques¬tion of their mutual relation in Husserl remains open.
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