The paper aims to reconstruct rationally Marek Siemek's social transcendental philosophy. Social transcendental philosophy is construed of not only as transcendental and social philosophy, but primarily as social ontology of knowledge, or to put it more aptly - as social ontology of meaning-creating practices. The author pays special attention to the status of philosophical claims about meaning-creating practices and tries to show that Kantian notion of apriority cannot be reduced to analyticity. Transcendental claims are analyzed in the light of their justification procedures, i.e., so-called transcendental deductions. Social transcendental philosophy is justification-independent from empirical knowledge, but not content-independent. It is shown using the example of apparent psychologism in Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'. The dialectical interaction with empirical knowledge, or in Hegel's terms, mediation with it, is paraphrased in terms of natural ontological attitude. It turns out that there is no unbridgeable gap between the social transcendental philosophy and naturalism. In fact, many contemporary discussions in naturalism, for example in the philosophy of mind, share transcendental philosophical assumptions.
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