The goal of the paper is to expound a notion of conceptual apparatus, by revealing structure and functions of objects it designates. The notion has been developed by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in the mid of 30ties, within a standpoint of radical conventionalism. According to its proponents, a picture of world one bears is not stated directly by the data of experience, but depends on conceptual apparatus chosen. Ajdukiewicz defines the notion consequently, referring it to a set of all meanings attributed to expressions in a closed and compact language. Nevertheless, it turns out to be vague, since it inherits the vagueness from presupposed categories, especially from ambiguously used category of meaning. The article comprises therefore a progressive reconstruction of assumed notions, including idea of closed and compact language, idea of meaning rules and idea of matrix of a language. As inquiry exposes, the structure of conceptual apparatus consists of: (1) meaning rules forcing to assert a set of statements within a closed and compact language and (2) the set of statements, which may be asserted. Its function is to force the user of the language to assert some of those statements, while facing data of experience. The notion, however, seems to be inconsistent, in order to the presupposed idea of closed and compact language. Bearing on its basis, it is impossible to face the same data of experience within two different conceptual apparatuses. Apart of the critique, article arises a set of new problems worth further studies within the topic, including the issue of relation of the notion to some related ones, e.g. to interpretative framework or cognitive scheme.
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