The moment in which a theory is conceived as useless superstructure of activity, is critical for the understanding of thinking and acting as separated qualities. From one point of view this separation is being criticized, on the other hand, the proposal of making the connection assumes the separation, that was already rejected. Solving the problem requires reaching for the arguments against radical separation of thinking and acting and, to inquire about a possibility of some primary union of them. This is the moment in which the title category of 'thinking in which we act' emerges. Opposite to representing 'thinking of', thinking in which we act is understood as the space, the area, the 'horizon' within which different actions are undertaken. This way the dialog as a form of activity is a different action in the instrumental rationality, then it is in (e.g.) the hermeneutical - critical rationality.
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