The notion of self-consciousness (self-awareness) has been the subject of a reach and complex analysis in the phenomenological and analytic tradition. On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. For the phenomenologists, self-consciousness is not something that comes about the moment one reflectively introspects one's experiences. In the most basic sense of the term, self-consciousness is pre-reflective or implicit self-awareness. The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is related to the idea that conscious experiences have a subjective feel to them or phenomenal quality of what it is like to have them. In the article the author attempts to show that if phenomenal character of conscious experience can be explained in terms of implicit self-awareness, then the problem of phenomenal character (what-it-is-like dimension of conscious experience) just is the problem of implicit or pre-reflective self-awareness. His conclusion is that phenomenology, neuroscience, and analytic philosophy would profit from a more open exchange.
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