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The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.