This article presents three factors affecting the development of auditing services market and its oligopoly. The binding provisions of law concerning discretionary powers of auditing companies' proprietary rights, to some extent, petrify the current auditing market structure. By means of numerous capital access deterrents they make it impossible to compete with the most influential entities on the market. Bearing in mind the vital influence of statutory auditors on companies' functioning, and allowing the companies access to capital, it is advisable to abolish all binding restrictions and simultaneously strengthen the internal control mechanisms facilitating high quality of financial review and statutory auditors' independence. The auditing services market is, most of all, subject to price competition. The binding requisition of statutory auditors' (including auditing companies) salary disclosure intensifies mutual chain of audit pricing dependence and restricts competition. Properly utilized rotation principle, by strengthening the competence, might positively influence functioning of the auditing services market. It increases an opportunity of collaborating with new entities, while enforcing constant improvement of qualifications required to perform financial reviews. Hence its wider use should be postulated.
Financed by the National Centre for Research and Development under grant No. SP/I/1/77065/10 by the strategic scientific research and experimental development program:
SYNAT - “Interdisciplinary System for Interactive Scientific and Scientific-Technical Information”.