In this paper the author demonstrates the understanding of original value cognition in the philosophy of M. Scheler and D. von Hildebrand. Scheler distinguishes between the feeling of value, the emotional reaction of response, preferring and 'placing after' and the act of love. In 'Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung' Hildebrand writes about the value feeling, the recognition of value (unfeeling) and the knowledge (that something is valuable). In 'Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis' he distinguishes between value feeling, the seeing of value, and value knowledge (Kennen). Value response, so typical for Hildebrand, is not the cognition of value but only its basis.
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