The author's aim is to show that the elaborated and very attractive theory of the purely intentional object developed by Roman Ingarden within the framework of his ontology is nevertheless untenable. The main reason of this is the false assumption, generally accepted in phenomenology, that some existing object always corresponds to an act of consciousness. This general issue has been investigated in author's paper 'On Intending and Being Intended' (to appear in Studia Philosophiae Christianae). In the present paper however he is dealing with the more detailed question of the relation between Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object and his ontology. He maintains that the existential and formal description of the purely intentional object contradicts the general characteristics of the object as such, developed in Ingarden's Hauptwerk: 'Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt'. With this respect three main objections can be mentioned: inconsistency in the existential characterization of the purely intentional being, incomprehensibility of the formal 'two-sidedness' of the purely intentional object and finally - lack of the authentic unity of the intentional content.
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