This paper is dedicated to certain models of commodity bundling, which occurs when two or more goods are offered together. The packet usually consists of one unit of each good, but it may also contain both goods in a fixed proportion. Owing to commodity bundling a seller may practise price discrimination. It takes place when the price of the packet is not equal to the sum of the goods offered separately and the difference does not represent a consequence of a change in costs levels. Hence, a definition of price discrimination by G.J. Stigler is applied. As the models analysed in the paper have different assumptions, their results are clearly divergent, and sometimes even contradictory. The decisions of the enterprise are highly dependent on whether it operates as a monopolist or is exposed to some kind of competition, e.g. oligopolistic one. The aim of the paper is not only a presentation of the models, but an attempt to arrange them according to assumptions in each of them as well. The review of literature carried out in the paper points out that currently it is hard to find any empirical research showing the application of the discussed models in the economic reality. That is why the models of commodity bundling are a solid theoretical base for interesting analyses of price discrimination in markets for various goods, also in Poland.
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