According to the utilitarian reasoning, people should always choose the least bad option of action. For example, they should sacrifice one person to save more people. The act of demanding from anybody such a decision is named 'an unrestricted demand'. The justification of the belief that we should not address unrestricted demands to anybody usually takes form of deontological argumentation (deontological strategy), which points to deontological principles (e. g. 'do not kill') or rights (e. g. the right to live), leaving apart the consequences of the actions. In the following article we defend the thesis that the equally successful justification of the interdiction of addressing unrestricted demands can be formulated on the basis of the modified calculus of consequences (consequential strategy). Of course, modifying consequentialism by taking into account rights or egoistic motives is not sufficient. We can obtain the successful defence from unrestricted demands within the consequentialist frame by resigning from the impartiality condition on behalf of the evaluator relativity concept.
Financed by the National Centre for Research and Development under grant No. SP/I/1/77065/10 by the strategic scientific research and experimental development program:
SYNAT - “Interdisciplinary System for Interactive Scientific and Scientific-Technical Information”.