This essay aims at providing a sketch of a new theory of law's normativity. The author begins by defining normativity as a feature of rules: rules are normative if they are objective reasons for action. Also, he argues that one can explain normativity only within a well-defined ontological framework. Next, he criticizes two general ontological conceptions: monism and dualism. He shows that both are incapable of providing a foundation for a theory of normativity. Further, He utilizes Popper's idea of three worlds and Wittgenstein's remarks concerning rule-following in order to outline an ontological background for the developed conception of normativity. He claims that rules (legal, moral, conventional etc.) are emergent entities which supervene on both mental states and regularities of social interactions. Against this backdrop he sketches a conception of normativity, which is antifoundational and relativistic. He claims that one should distinguish between three types of rules, and three kinds of normativity: rudimentary, intermediate and abstract. He further says that it is the intermediate rules that we 'live by'.
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