Our article focuses on the late philosophy of Levinas, which can be characterized as an ethics of radical passivity, and on its limits (especially in the relationship between ethics/society). The aim is not, however, to overcome the dichotomy of passiv-ity/activity as other phenomenological authors attempt to do, but to deepen this differentiation to such an abysmal level that any sort of philosophy of action is eliminated from this late project of the ethics of passivity. Such a thorough separation of the ethics of responsibility from the entirety of the philosophy of action, one of the main aspects of Levinas’s late works, also has its limitations in Levinas’s thought itself. These limitations are associated with the entrance of the so-called “third party” into the sphere of the infinite responsibility for the Other. We attempt to interpret this contradiction of infinite ethics and finite Justice with the help of Foucault’s concepts of decisions, division, and exclusion.
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