The aim of this paper is to critically deal with two issues confronting naturalist philosophers who want to steer a middle course between radical naturalism and total 'a-priorism' in epistemology. These issues are (1) the role of 'a priori' in ordinary human knowledge, and (2) who succeeds and who fails in properly dealing with the skeptical challenge. The author focuses on the views of P. Kitcher and L. BonJour with an aim to display the strengths and weaknesses of the naturalist perspective. His conclusion is that there are prospects for a viable synthesis between a naturalist approach and old-fashioned normativity in epistemology. Moreover, it seems that neither camp is in an inherently advantageous position with regard to skeptical worries or challenges.
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