It is generally agreed that the account of space and time in the Treatise of Human Nature does not belong to the best of Hume’s writings, although running against this general consensus is the opinion of V. F. Kruse. This article argues that Hume’s treatment of space and time, especially his argument against infinite divisibility, suffers from serious imperfections. It must be admitted, however, that Hume’s difficulties arise mostly from the consistent application of his doctrine of impressions and ideas. Perhaps Hume’s own dissatisfaction and his ambition to find favour with the public were the reasons why there is no corresponding part dealing with space and time in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. But as the main principles have not been changed in this later work, Hume would not have come to substantially different conclusions if he had dealt with the same subject in detail in the Enquiry.
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