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We consider a zero-sum stochastic game where two players have a common observation of a global state, and each player makes a private observation of its local state at every time step. This asymmetry of information among the players makes it difficult to the compute the equilibrium cost (called the value of the zero-sum game). To help us determine the value of such a game, we first consider a game...
We model attacks on a cyberphysical system as a game between two players—the attacker and the system. The players may not acquire the complete information about each other, and that leads to an asymmetric information game. Furthermore, the players may have a certain fixed amount of resources, which constrains their strategies across time. Accordingly, we consider a dynamic multiplayer nonzero sum...
We consider a scenario in which a controller and an adversary dynamically act on a system over a finite or infinite horizon. The controller and the adversary do not want to reveal their actions to each other, and at the same time, the controller acts to minimize an expected cost, and the adversary acts to maximize it. We model this scenario as a dynamic zero-sum game, prove the existence of a unique...
We consider a jamming attack on a transmitter-receiver pair, in which the transmitter wants to transmit the state of an i.i.d. Gaussian process across an unsecured communication channel to the receiver while minimizing its cost functional. The transmitter decides whether or not to transmit the current state of the random process. The jammer disrupts the transmission on the channel strategically in...
We consider a model of stealthy attack on a networked control system by formulating a static zero-sum game among four players. Three of the players constitute a team of encoder, decoder and controller for a scalar discrete-time linear plant, while the fourth player is a jammer, who acts to flip the bits of the binary encoded observation signal of the communication channel between the plant and the...
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